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Abstract - This paper provides further evidence in favor of less than fully rational expectations by making 
use two instruments, one quite well known, and the other more novel, namely survey data on inflation 
expectations and Smooth Transition Error Correction Models (STECMs). We use the so called  ‘probabilistic 
approach’ to derive a quantitative measure of expected inflation from qualitative survey data for France, Italy 
and the UK. The United States are also included by means of the Michigan Survey of Consumers’ 
expectations series. First, we perform the standard tests to assess the ‘degree of rationality’ of consumers’ 
inflation forecasts. Afterwards, we specify a STECM of the forecast error, and we quantify the strategic 
stickiness in the long-run adjustment process of expectations stemming from money illusion. Our evidence is 
that consumers’ expectations do not generally conform to the prescriptions of the rational expectations 
hypothesis. In particular, we find that the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium is highly 
nonlinear and it is asymmetric with respect to the size of the past forecast errors. We interpret these findings 
as supporting the money illusion hypothesis. 
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 1 Introduction
In￿ ation expectations are kept under close watch by many: business consultants,
investors, policy makers, and last, but not least, economic researchers. Yet,
dealing with expectations is a very complex task since it involves two orders of
di¢ culties. First, expectations are by nature unobservable, hence one needs to
￿nd a way to track them as closely as possible. Second, even after a good proxy
for expectations is found, one still needs to understand what is the mechanism
underlying their formation. More speci￿cally, many e⁄orts of the literature have
been concentrated on understanding to which extent do expectations conform
to the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) (Muth 1961, and Lucas 1987).
On the other side, relatively few have dealt with investigating whether other
behavioral insights other than the generic notion of ￿ inattentiveness￿play a role
in explaining in￿ ation expectations dynamics. This paper aims at ￿lling the
gap by using some recent advances in nonlinear time series econometrics.
Recently, the problem of unobservability of expectations has partially been
overcome thanks to the availability of direct survey data. These kind of data
are very valuable because they yield direct observations of in￿ ation expectations
without the need of a priori assumptions on their nature.1 Nevertheless, the lit-
erature is far from having reached a consensus on what mechanism underlies the
process of expectations formation and adjustment.2 In particular, to the best
our knowledge there have been no attempts so far to study the long-run adjust-
ment process of in￿ ation expectations without renouncing to the assumption of
linearity, implicit in the idea of perfect rationality.3
While the literature customarily tests the degree of rationality of expecta-
tions within the standard (linear) cointegration framework (Engle and Granger
1987, and Johansen 1991), we use a novel nonlinear cointegration approach
enabling us to understand what in￿ uences the speed of adjustment of expec-
tations in the long-run, and whether there are signi￿cant asymmetries in such
adjustment process. More speci￿cally, we use Smooth Transition Error Cor-
rection Models (STECMs), a ￿ exible econometric speci￿cation which captures
the long-run dynamics of variables with a nonlinear-asymmetric adjustment to-
wards the equilibrium.4 So far, STECMs have been applied to interest rates
1To be more precise, when using survey data one still needs a priori assumptions, but
only on the form of the ditribution of aggregate in￿ation expectations. For example, the
Carlson and Parkin￿ s (1975) method we also employ to convert qualitative survey data into
quantitative ones, assumes a logistic distribution function.
2The contributions on the degree of rationality of expectations are several. See for example
Berk (1999, 2000), Arnold and Lemmen (2006), Forsells and Kenny (2002), Gerberding (2009)
Curto and Milet (2006), and Pjafary and Santoro (2009) among others.
3The REH posits that in￿ation expectations should have three testable characteristics:
long-run unbiasedness, ￿ e¢ ciency￿with respect to available information, and mean reversion
with respect to the forecast error￿ s long-run ￿ rational￿value. The latter feature was ￿rst noted
by Bakhshi and Yates (1998), who start from observing that both in￿ation and in￿ation
expectations generally display a unit root and hence their interpretation of the REH is that
in the long run they should cointegrate, possibly with coe¢ cients of the cointegrating vector
equal in absolute value. Clearly, such de￿nition involves the notion of a constant (linear)
adjustment process.
4A STECM model can be viewed as a generalization of the standard linear ECM model
1(Van Dijk and Franses, 2000), real exchange rates (BØreau, L￿pez Villavicencio
and Mignon, 2010), stock returns (Jawadi and Kouba, 2004) and house prices
(Balcilar, Gupta and Shah, 2010). We are convinced that applying STECMs
to in￿ ation expectations can shed some new light on the asymmetries inherent
to the long-run adjustment process of expectations, thereby providing useful
insights both to policy makers and to researchers.
In this work the standard ￿ probabilistic approach￿ (Carlson and Parking
1975, Berk 1999) is employed to derive a quantitative measure of expected
in￿ ation from the European Commission￿ s (EC) Consumer Survey data5. Our
sample comprehends 298 monthly observations (1985-2009) for France, Italy and
the UK. For sake of comparability with previous studies, we also include the
US in the sample by means of the Michigan Survey of Consumers￿expectations
series. First, we perform the standard tests to assess the ￿ degree of rationality￿of
in￿ ation expectations and, like others in this literature, we infer that consumers
behave quite di⁄erently than what the REH postulates. Afterwards, we test for
a nonlinear type of weak rationality that we label strategic stickiness by means of
a Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (STECM) of the forecast error. We
call strategic stickiness the type of inertia in the adjustment of expectations that
Fehr and Tyran (2001) document in their experimental setting as a by-product
of money illusion.6 It is the inertia that arises from nominal loss aversion in a
context of strategic complementarities: people are reluctant to reduce nominal
prices after a negative monetary shock because they expect that the others
will do the same, actually yielding a higher nominal loss. We have two main
results. First, consumers tend to over-estimate in￿ ation both in the short and
long-run. Second, strategic stickiness does play an important role in shaping
the expectations long-run adjustment dynamics. Furthermore, big and negative
shocks have generally a greater in￿ uence in speeding up the adjustment process
than small and positive ones.
It is important to notice that many factors may be responsible for the non-
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), allowing for a nonlinear adjustment mechanism. In
this type of models the standard constant feedback parameter is replaced by a continuous
function, the so called transition function, which is bounded between (0;1). Generally the
transition function is chosen to be either a logistic function, when one tries to capture sign
asymmetries or a second order logistic function, when size asymmetries are thought to be
more important. For a detailed description STECMs please refer to Anderson (1995), Van
Dijk and Franses (2000), and Kapetanios, Shin and Snell (2003).
5Even though this method is quite standard in the literature, there are many authors point-
ing at its drawbacks mainly due to its assumption of a normal distribution of expectations.
Indeed, many methods of correction have been proposed (we chose the one of Berk, 1999) but
also many alternative methods are available. Nevertheless, evaluating which of them performs
better is beyond the scope of this paper, and for a more detailed treatement of these issues
we suggest to refer to Nardo (2003).
6The term money illusion seems to have been coined by Irving Fisher as "the failure to
perceive that the dollar, or any other unit of money, expands or shrinks in value" (1928, p.4).
Fehr and Tyran (2001) give a somewhat more precise de￿nition, by saying that one is prone to
money illusion if i) his/her objective function depends on both nominal and real magnitudes
and ii) He/she perceives purely nominal changes a⁄ecting his/her opportunity sets. For a
thorough treatment of money illusion please see Sha￿r, Diamond and Trevsky (1997), Fehr
and Tyran (2001, 2007, 2008).
2linear dynamics we ￿nd in our data: for example slow information di⁄usion
(Mankiw and Reis 2002, Carrol 2003), Near Rational behavior towards in￿ ation
(Akerlof and Yellen 1985, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 2000, Ball 2000, Maugeri
2010), and in general all the decision heuristics implying less then full adjust-
ment to errors. Among those, this paper stresses the relevance of money Illusion
as a parsimonious explanation of the nonlinearity of the adjustment towards the
equilibrium. Indeed, our smooth transition model for the adjustment process
can be viewed as a reduced form of structural models of expectations formations
accounting for nonlinearities due to a number of less than fully rational decision
mechanisms, the most parsimonious of those being money illusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a gen-
eral description of our dataset while section 3 develops some formal procedures
to assess various theories of expectation formation. First we describe the hy-
potheses of adaptive expectations and sticky information di⁄usion, then rational
expectations tests both in ￿ weak￿and ￿ strong￿form are discussed, and ￿nally
strategic stickiness is assessed. Section 5 presents the results of our empirical
investigation and section 6 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Data
Increasing availability of direct survey measures of in￿ ation expectations caused
a massive interest of the literature in this topic. The pioneering survey study
on consumers expectations is the Survey of Consumers devised in the late 40s
by George Katona at the University of Michigan. Parallerly, from 1968 to 1990
the National Bureau of Economic Research, and later the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, conducted the ￿rst survey on the ￿ professional￿views on ex-
pectations, i.e. the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The European
Commission has started in 1985 to follow the lead of its foreign rivals, by elab-
orating surveys on both consumers￿and professional forecasters￿expectations
for the Euro area7.
Our dataset is composed by monthly CPI in￿ ation rates and in￿ ation ex-
pectations series both for consumers and for professionals, from January 1985
to October 20098. The sample comprehends three main European countries,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, and the United States. The in￿ a-
tion rate series are taken from, respectively, the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW), the Italian statistical O¢ ce (ISTAT), the English O¢ ce for
National Statistics, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The series are all
unadjusted for seasonality. The choice of this subset of European countries is
7Both European surveys are basically designed following the US example. One main dif-
ference though, is that while the survey of consumers provides data both at a country level
of disaggregation and at the Euro-area level of aggregation, the European SPF is available
only for the Euro area as an aggregate.That is the main reason why in order to proxy the
experts￿expecations we decided not to use the EU-SPF data, but the Consensus Economics
data, made available to us by the courtesy of Christina Gerberding.
8Actually, the French range of available observations is a little bit shorter than the other,
since the in￿ation rate series starts from 1990.
3mainly motivated by the fact that these three countries are the ones with greater
data availability (about 290 monthly observations on average). The US data are
inserted in the dataset mainly to have a reference point with respect to previous
studies9.
The consumers in￿ ation expectations series for France, Italy and the UK are
elaborated by applying the so called ￿ probability approach￿(Carlson and Parkin,
1975) to the qualitative data of the European Commission Survey10. Following
Berk (1999 and 2000), we apply a rescaling of the expectations series by means
of ￿ perceived in￿ ation￿ , as the literature shows that such rescaling dramatically
improves the representativeness of the derived expectation measure. Figure 1
displays the series of in￿ ation and consumers expectations over the chosen time
sample.
The professionals forecasters￿expectations series for Italy, France and the
UK are elaborated from the London based ￿rm Consensus Economics. From
1989, this ￿rm asks to renewed experts at the beginning of each month to fore-
cast the development of important macroeconomic variables11. The US series
is the SPF measure elaborated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
One of the main criticisms made to the use of consumers based measures of
expectations is that survey takers might have little incentives to correctly state
their perception of future price developments. On the contrary, business experts￿
opinions should be driven by market forces to track actual in￿ ation as closely
as possible. As a matter of fact, a comparison of ￿gure 1 with ￿gure 2 clearly
reveals that on average experts have a lower forecast error than consumers.
What is also clear from ￿gure 1, is that consumers were not able to forecast
the 2008 ￿nancial crisis and the subsequent trough of in￿ ation12. Even though
there seems to be a strong relationship between actual and expected in￿ ation,
consumers have underpredicted and overpredicted in￿ ation much more than
experts, at least in the ￿rst part of the sample. Moreover, after the switch to
the common currency in 1999, European consumers seem to have believed to the
low in￿ ation commitment of the European Central Bank (ECB) and anticipated
the consequent downward trend in in￿ ation.
To provide a more quantitative evaluation of the forecast performance of
both consumers and experts, Table 1 provides some standard indicators: the
Mean Error (ME), showing the average forecast error over the sample period,
the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) which measures how close are predictions to
the actual in￿ ation rates, and the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) which
represents the expected value of the squared error loss, hence it is less sensitive
to large forecast errors or outliers. Consistent with our graphical evidence,
experts have on average a better forecast performance than consumers, since
9For studies on the US see Curtin (2005), Bryan Venkatu (2001), Anderson (2008) and
Pfajfary and Santoro (2009), among others.
10See the Appendix for more details.
11We really thank Christina Geberding for making these data available to us.
12Actually, since even the reat part of economists were not able to predict the ￿nancial
crisis, we did not expect consumers to do so. Unfortunately, our series of experts￿forecast
arrives until 2006 for the majority of countries, hence we cannot give any quantitive judgement
of the the experts￿forceast performance in 2008.
45their MAEs and RMSEs are systematically lower. However, both consumers and
experts seem to frequently commit large but counterbalancing errors, as shown
by the fact that the ME is always much lower than the MAE. Another interesting
￿nding that emerges from table 1 is that experts seem to have interiorized the
credibility strategy of the ECB much more than the public, as shown from
the systematically lower MAE and RMSE in the second subsample. On the
other hand, consumers do not seem to have a clear idea of this strategy in
every country: only Italian consumers have decreased their MAEs and RMSEs
in the Euro-era subsample, while French and US citizens have worsened their
forecast performance. For English consumers it is not possible to give a precise
judgment, since in the second subsample the MAE increases but the RMSE
decreases. On the contrary, our US reference point indicates that during the
pre Euro-era American consumers had a much clearer picture in their mind of
what was happening to in￿ ation than in the following decades.
A ￿nal word on comparability of our expectations measures. Our results
are broadly in line with the previous ￿ndings of the literature, which report
a RMSE for European aggregate in￿ ation expectations between 0:47 and 1:29
(Forsells and Kenny, 2002). Again, one could take the study on the US by Lloyd
(1999) as a reference: He ￿nds a RMSE for the period 1983-1997 between 1:09
and 1:57, also very close to our estimates.
63 Assessing Theories of Rationality
This section brie￿ y describes the di⁄erent theoretical hypotheses we will test
throughout the paper, with special attention to their econometric implemen-
tation. The section is organized chronologically, it starts by illustrating the
adaptive expectations hypothesis and it complements it with the much newer
notion of sticky information di⁄usion (Mankiw and Reis 2002; Carrol, 2003).
Subsequently, the Rational Expectations Hypothesis is thoroughly described in
its ￿ weak￿and ￿ strong￿form, although the section gives a prominent role to
what we call strategic stickiness￿ , that is to say ￿ weak rationality￿with asym-
metric adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium. Section 4 then
will conclude the analysis, by dealing with estimation issues and presenting our
empirical results.
3.1 Adaptive Expectations and Sticky Information Di⁄u-
sion
The ￿rst idea on expectations was that people could revise their predictions
according to their past forecast errors. The Adaptive expectations hypothesis
was suggested by Irving Fisher in 1930, and then it was formalized by Cagan
(1956), Friedman (1957), and Nerlove (1958). The standard way to assess the




t￿1 + ￿(￿t￿1 ￿ ￿e
t￿1) + ￿t (Adaptiveness)
Here the parameter ￿ assumes an important role, since it captures the speed
of adjustment of current expectations to the past forecast error. However, as
the recent literature on inattentiveness suggests, the speed of this adjustment
mechanism depends not only on the subjective ￿ degree of adaptiveness￿ , but
it is also in￿ uenced by how fast the information is di⁄used in the economy
and by how costly is obtaining and updating information sets. According to
such considerations, equation (Adaptiveness) should be complemented by an




SPF;t + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿e
t￿1 + ￿t (Sticky info)
Equation (Sticky info) summarizes the core of Carrol￿ s (2003a) model of ￿ epi-
demiological￿di⁄usion of information about in￿ ation, and it posits that house-
holds slowly update their information sets from news reports, which are in turn
in￿ uenced by professional forecasters. In such a context, ￿e
SPF;t is the mean
in￿ ation at time t as predicted by experts (i.e. Consensus Economics￿forecasts
for France, Italy and the UK, and SPF forecasts for the US), and the coe¢ cient
￿
￿1
1 is interpreted as the average updating period for households￿information
sets. Please notice that equation (Sticky info) considers a type of expectations￿
stickiness which is only due to the intrinsic di¢ culty to get updated information
about in￿ ation from the news. On the other hand, the strategic stickiness we
7put our emphasis on is of a di⁄erent type, in the sense that it has to do with
strategic complementarities among agents￿forecasts in the presence of money
illusion.
3.2 ￿ Strong￿Rationality
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) (Muth, 1961) in its ￿ strong ver-
sion￿ , posits that in￿ ation expectations should have two testable characteristics:
long-run unbiasedness, and ￿ e¢ ciency￿with respect to available information. As
we will see later, a weaker version of the REH assumes the expectations only
display mean reversion with respect to their long-run ￿ rational￿value. The idea
of rational expectations is that agents can match on average the predictions of
the relevant economic models. This translates into an estimated forecast error
which should be centered around zero (unbiasedness property) and should not
be correlated with variables included in their information sets at the time pre-
dictions were made (orthogonality property). Tests for e¢ ciency in the use of
information are extensively undertaken by the current literature, hence in this
work we will start our analysis by focusing on the a investigation of unbiasedness
property.13
It is common practice in papers using survey data on expectations to test
the strong version of the REH by estimating a series of OLS equations of the
following type
￿t ￿ ￿e
t = ￿ + ￿t (Rationality 1)
￿t = ￿ + ￿￿e
t + ￿t (Rationality 2)
￿t ￿ ￿e
t = ￿ + (￿ ￿ 1)￿e
t + ￿t (Rationality 3)
where we indicate with ￿t the actual in￿ ation rate for period t, and with ￿e
t the
expected in￿ ation rate for period t calculated in period t￿12. By analyzing the
properties of the estimated forecast error of these equations and the accurateness
of the parameters estimates, gives an idea of whether the REH is veri￿ed on
average.
3.3 ￿ Weak Rationality￿
Many authors claim that the strong version of the REH, the one involving unbi-
asedness and e¢ ciency, might be ￿ too strong￿ , given the informational frictions
and transaction costs present in reality. What characterizes rational expecta-
tions according to many, is that there is mean reversion of expectations towards
the correct mean in￿ ation value, that is to say ￿e
t and ￿t cointegrate in the
long-run. The pioneering work on this issue by Bakhshi and Yates (1998) starts
exactly by observing that both in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations are I(1) vari-
ables, hence their dynamic interpretation of the REH is that in the long run they
should cointegrate, possibly with coe¢ cients of the cointegrating vector equal
13See Gerbering (2007) and Forsells and Kenny (2002) among others.
8in absolute value. This interpretation of the REH yields two main implica-
tions: i) no matter how long is the adjustment, time movements of expectations
and in￿ ation rates should be linked in the long-run ii) The adjustment from
the short-run to the long-run always occurs with the same constant intensity,
captured by a linear-constant adjustment function.
In order to be more clear let us assume that ￿e
t and ￿t are given by
￿t = ￿e




Where "it i = 1;2 has the standard properties. Then the weak version of the
REH posits that there is a cointegrating relationship between the two variables
of the type
￿t = ￿ + ￿￿e
t + zt (2)
with zt = ￿1zt￿1; j￿1j < 1 and ￿ = 0 , ￿ = 1
In practice, what one does in order to understand whether this is veri￿ed by the
data is to perform a standard cointegration analysis on the two series including
tests for the appropriate coe¢ cients restrictions.
3.4 Strategic Stickiness: ￿ Weak Rationality￿and Asym-
metric Adjustment
Sustaining that people are on average correct in their forecasts of in￿ ation is one
thing, sustaining that they perform these correction tasks always in the same
way is something di⁄erent. Indeed, the standard notion of ￿ weak rationality￿
(equations 1 and 2) implicitly assumes that in the long-run there is a constant
linear adjustment process linking expectations to the actual mean value of in￿ a-
tion. However Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2004 and 2008) suggest that expectations
of nominal variables often display a sticky and asymmetric adjustment. More
speci￿cally, their experiments show that in a context where decisions are con-
￿ned with nominal magnitudes, people are reluctant to reduce nominal prices
after a negative monetary shock because they anticipate that the others will
do the same, hence actually magnifying the aggregate nominal inertia. As ex-
pected, this type of inertia we call strategic stickiness, is much larger after a
negative nominal shock than after a positive one and it also depends on the size
of the shock.
If one wants to represent this case, and the data generating processes of ￿e
t
and ￿t still follow (1), then strategic stickiness implies that there is a cointe-
grating relationship for the two variables of the type
￿t = ￿ + ￿￿e
t + zt (3)
with zt = F(zt￿1) + ut; z stationary; and ut
iid ￿ (0;￿2
u)
9Where F(:);the transition function, is a continuous nonlinear functional form
bounded in the (0;1) interval, capturing asymmetries in the adjustment process
stemming from strategic stickiness. Notice that here we chose the simple case
where the deviation from the long-run equilibrium zt behaves like a ￿rst order
stochastic process, but clearly a more general case involves a transition function
F(zt￿d) with an higher lag order d = f1;2;:::g.14
Our aim is to investigate strategic stickiness by specifying a STECM model
of consumers￿forecast error with the general structure:
Dyt = ’0
1wt + F(zt￿d;￿;c) 
0
2wt + "t (4)
where yt is in our case either ￿t or ￿e
t; depending on the speci￿cation, and xt is
respectively either ￿e
t or ￿t, the cointegration relationship is indicated by zt =
￿t￿￿￿￿￿e
t, ￿ and ￿ are the ones estimated during the preliminary cointegration
analysis, wt = (1; e wt)0; e wt = (zt￿1;Dyt￿1;:::;Dyt￿p+1;Dxt;:::;Dxt￿p+1)0, for
i = 1;2, m = 2p ￿ 1: Finally ’1 = (’10;’11;:::;’1m)
0 and
 2 = ( 21; 22;:::; 2m)0 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
There are two main reasons why we think this approach is valuable. First,
from the econometric point of view it builds on standard cointegration analysis
and it amends some of its weaknesses by assessing possible neglected nonlin-
earities in the ECM adjustment process. Second, from the theoretical point of
view, the nonlinear adjustment mechanism is a ￿ exible speci￿cation allowing
for asymmetric e⁄ects of shocks which di⁄er in size and sign: the choice of the
transition function can give us precise indications on which type of asymmetry
matters more to explain agents￿money illusion. Finally, the STECM approach
has the further advantage of not having to impose any prior on rationality, and
to ￿ let the data choose￿the type of nonlinearity better ￿tting them by means of
the appropriate transition function.
4 Results
Our empirical assessment of theories of rationality starts by performing the
standard rationality tests that the literature has proposed so far. As we already
pointed out, there are already some studies in the literature analyzing the prop-
erties of both the EU and the US consumers expectations series15. However,
most of them employ data up to 2006, hence it is interesting to see whether the
results change with an updated dataset16. The section then continues by propos-
ing our strategy to assess ￿ weak rationality￿in the form of strategic stickiness.
14Notice also that the stationarity condition for zt in this case is more complicated than
the standard one, because it depends on the chosen form of the F(:) function.
15For example, Forsells and Kenny (2002) use the EC￿ s consumers data to analyse the
properties of expected in￿ation for the euro area as an aggregate. Arnold and Lemmen
(2008) also use the EC￿ s Consumer Survey to assess whether in￿ation expectations have
converged and whether in￿ation uncertainty has diminished following the introduction of the
Euro in Europe. Gerberding (2009) provides an interesting comparison between consumers￿
and experts￿expectations in France, Italy, Germany and UK.
16Clearly, we are aware that a longer time span comes at the cost of maybe having a
structural break and/or one or more outliers in the sample due to the 2008 ￿nancial crisis.
10We estimate a STECM model for the countries of interest and we analyze the
properties of the estimated transition function so that we can have an indication
of what in￿ uences the speed of adjustment of expectations in the long-run. The
tests for adaptive expectations, sticky information di⁄usion and rational expec-
tations are all implemented by means of heteroskedasticity corrected OLS, while
the STECM estimation for strategic stickiness is done by means of nonlinear
least squares.
4.1 Adaptive Expectations and Sticky Information Di⁄usion
To which extent so consumers correct their expectations looking at past errors?
and how much does the speed of di⁄usion of news about in￿ ation in￿ uences this
process? The results of the estimation of both equations (Adaptiveness) and
(Sticky info) in table 2 can provide an answer to these questions.
In the adaptive expectations test, the adjustment coe¢ cient to past errors is
quite small for France, UK and the US, averaging at 2%; Parallerly the average
updating time for those countries is estimated to be very di⁄erent, as people
update their information sets respectively once every 4,17 and 10 months. Italy
Nevertheless, since our focus is on the e⁄ects of the size of shocks on the adjustment of
consumers expectations, we decided keep this long time sample, momentarily leaving the
model stability issue in the background.
11is a special case though, since the adjustment coe¢ cient is very high (14%) but
the average updating period is the longest, about 21 months. The estimated ￿
coe¢ cient in equation (Adaptiveness) is very close to one in all speci￿cations
and hence it is of particular interest for two reasons: from the theoretical point
of view, there is an high degree of backward looking behavior in expectations
formation dynamics; from the econometric point of view, there is an high degree
of persistence in in￿ ation expectations, which needs to be handled with the
appropriate techniques. As a consequence of that, some of the rationality tests
we will apply in the next paragraph handle such persistence with the appropriate
techniques.
Rationality
In what follows we assess the REH in its so called ￿ strong￿and ￿ weak￿version.
The general way to test for unbiasedness is estimating equation (Rationality
2) and then testing the null H0 : (￿;￿) = (0;1). However, since Holden and
Peel (1990) showed that the condition ￿ = 0 is both necessary and su¢ cient for
unbiasedness, while (￿;￿) = (0;1) is not necessary, we can simply use equation
(Rationality 1) to see whether expectations error are centered around the right
value and then test if such value can be conveniently restricted to zero. Equation
(Rationality 3) is simply a way to augment equation (Rationality 2) in order
to cross-checks the previous results and to see whether all available information
is fully exploited. Please notice that all these three equations are expected to
have no predictive power under the null of rationality. Table 3 gives the results
of the three estimation for each country in the sample.
Our estimates of equation (Rationality 1) suggest that in our sample the
necessary condition for unbiasedness is never met, the only exception being
the US. Furthermore, the su¢ cient condition is also never satis￿ed for the all
four countries, as indicated by the signi￿cant Chi-squared statistics of equations
(Rationality 2)17.
Clearly that these ￿rst tests of ￿ strong rationality￿give such results, does not
exclude that other notions of rationality are still in place. A somewhat weaker
notion of rationality might be more appropriate, especially once acknowledged
that we are dealing with nonstationary variables. Here we follow the approach
￿rst introduced by Bakhshi and Yates (1998) and we try to understand if expec-
tations and in￿ ation move together at least in a long-run perspective, i.e. they
cointegrate. After performing the standard unit roots test on both variables
(not shown), and having con￿rmed that they are all integrated of order one, we
carried on the standard cointegration tests by Johansen (1981) and estimated
the corresponding bivariate vector ECM of the form








t￿i + ￿￿t (In￿ ation)
17Notice that the R-squared for the three equations is not always as low as expected, but
this has probably to do with our variables being integrated and hence it is probably a spurious
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where c0 and g0 are constants, c￿ and ge are the ECM adjustment coe¢ cients,
and the lag length p is selected in preliminary VAR analysis (not shown).The
results of equation (Rationality 3) provide a further con￿rmation of what we
found so far, as the parameters are generally not close to the their theoretical
values (0;1). Our results are in line with the ones of Forsells and Kenny (2002)
and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010), and they con￿rm the poor forecast performance
of consumers. Over the full time sample, which probably contains at least one
structural break and some outliers due to the current ￿nancial crisis, expecta-
tions are systematically overestimated (￿ is always positive, the only exception
being the US), as also con￿rmed by the estimated ￿ which is above 1 in all coun-
tries except France. Tables 4 and 5 report the results of this ￿nal rationality
test.
What we ￿rst notice from a general examination of the two tables is that the
coe¢ cients of the cointegrating vectors are di⁄erent in absolute value. This goes
against the de￿nition of ￿ weak rationality￿ , but from a broader perspective it also
tells us that the existent long-run relationship between ￿e
t and ￿t involves also a
systematic over/underprediction of in￿ ation18. Here we interpret this long-run
relationship as the ￿ ecologically rational￿prediction for in￿ ation, because it can
be considered the outcome of one of the most parsimonious heuristic that people
have given the available information sets: money illusion19. Indeed reasoning
in nominal terms and ignoring low future in￿ ation is a powerful rule of thumb
in a low and stable in￿ ation environment, like the EMU (at least before the
￿nancial crisis). On the other hand, the ￿t of these VECM models is generally
satisfactory, with reasonable values for the coe¢ cients but with a problem of
non-normality and heteroskedasticity in the residuals (statistics not shown).
In particular, the ECM adjustment coe¢ cients are usually signi￿cant and with
opposite signs. This indicates that there is a potential two-way feedback between
in￿ ation and expectations. More speci￿cally, If ge > 0 and c￿ < 0, not only
expectations adjust towards their ￿ ecologically rational value￿ , but also actual
in￿ ation adjusts to the level expected by the public, as in the Friedman-Phelps
framework.
Strategic Stickiness
Investigating strategic stickiness builds on the cointegration analysis we per-
formed so far. As we saw, there is some evidence for cointegration between
in￿ ation and its expectation, but the cointegrating relationship does not look
18Depending on the speci￿cation, the cointegrating vector also contains a constant and a
trend.
19A decision rule or an heuristic is de￿ned as ￿ ecologically rational￿if it exploits structures
of information that are already in the environment, allowing the decision maker to save on
information processing and gathering costs. For a broader perspective on this issue see Smith
(2002) and Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002).
1415like the one stemming from a rational behavior due to systematic biases. Fur-
thermore, the VECM estimated residuals display some heteroskedasticity that
could arise from neglected nonlinearities
In order to shed more light on these issues, we employ the STECM approach
suggested by VDF (2000) and we start by estimating a conditional ECM model
for the forecast error, as it can be seen from table 620.
As noted earlier, the linear models do not seem to perform badly. Parameters
signi￿cance is quite satisfactory and the residuals seem to be well behaved, a part
from a problem of heteroskedasticity indicated by the high ARCH(1) statistic.
However, with the models in CECM form we are able to investigate the issue of
neglected nonlinearity by applying the LM test by Lukkonen et al (1988)-VDF
(2000) to past forecast errors zt￿d
21. Indeed the results of the test, displayed in
table 7, show that the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected for several values
of the lag length d of the past forecast error.
Beyond giving evidence of nonlinearities in the adjustment process stemming
from strategic stickiness, the test also gives us an indication of which of the past
forecast errors is responsible for such nonlinearities, as indicated by the lag order
d￿ with lowest p-value (underlined in table 7). An other important indication on
the type of strategic stickiness characterizing expectations is given from what
the data choose to be the appropriate transition function. In the literature,
three types of transition function are generally used.
When one suspects that it is sign asymmetry that matters more for the
adjustment process of the endogenous variable, one should use the logistic tran-
sition function. For example, there is evidence that many macroeconomic and
￿nancial variables seem to be a⁄ected in an asymmetric way by positive and
negative shocks22. In this case the transition function takes the form
F(zt￿d) ￿ F(zt￿d;￿;c) = (1 + expf￿￿(zt￿d ￿ c)g)￿1 ￿ > 0 (5)
By substituting (5) in (4) one obtains the logistic STECM, where positive
and negative deviations from the equilibrium relative to the threshold c will give
rise to di⁄erent e⁄ects, with zt being attracted towards 0 with a speed indicated
by ￿. The higher ￿; the faster the transition from ￿1 to ￿1 + ￿2, while as ￿
approaches in￿nity, the F(:) approaches an indicator function I[zt￿d > c]; with
I[A] = 1 if A = true and I[A] = 0 if A = false. On the other hand, when ￿
approaches zero we transition becomes linear as in the standard case.
In some other cases, size asymmetry may be more appropriate to describe
the dynamics of the endogenous. For example, large or small misalignments
of real e⁄ective exchange rates from their ￿ behavioral equilibrium￿values have
been shown to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the adjustment process of the exchange
20The ECM model is conditiona in the sense that it isolates either equation (??) or (??)
from the VECM, and it conditions it to an appropriate number of lagsof the other endogenous
variable.
21For technical details about the test, please refer to the appendix where we replicated an
entire an example of estimatation of a STECM from the paper of VDF (2000).
22A popular example is aggregate demand, reacting much more quickly to a negative change
in money supply than to a positive one.
1617rates itself (BØreau, Villavicencio,and Mignon, 2009). The exponential function
could be used to model this type of asymmetry
F(zt￿d) ￿ F(zt￿d;￿;c) = (1 ￿ exp
￿
￿￿(zt￿d ￿ c)2￿
) ￿ > 0 (6)
Here large (both positive and negative) deviations from the equilibrium grad-
ually change the strength of the adjustment, implying that when zt￿d = c the
F(:) is zero, while when zt￿d either decreases or increases to (minus) in￿nity,
then F(:) approaches one. The problem with the exponential function is that it
shrinks to a linear function when ￿ either approaches zero or in￿nity. If this is
not consistent with the dynamic behavior of the variable of interest, one might
use instead the quadratic logistic function
F(zt￿d) ￿ F(zt￿d;￿;c) = (1 + expf￿￿(zt￿d ￿ c1)(zt￿d ￿ c2)g)￿1 (7a)
￿ > 0 and c1 ￿ c2 (7b)
For ￿nite ￿; this particular function has a minimum value which is not equal
to zero, while for ￿ going to in￿nity F(:) is equal to one, both for zt￿d < c1 and
for zt￿d > c2; but it is equal to zero in between. As in the previous case, the
transition becomes linear when the speed parameter ￿ approaches zero.
From the practical point of view, in order to select the appropriate transition
variable and transition function for each of our countries, we started from the
indications of the nonlinearity test in table 7 but we also used a ￿ data speci￿c
approach￿consisting in ￿tting various speci￿cations and choosing the best one
according to model evaluation criteria. Indeed, this is also Terasvirta￿ s (1994)
18suggestion when dealing with nonlinear models, since the available tests might
have low power in the presence of possible mispeci￿cation errors. For what
regards the choice of the transition function we also took into considerations the
insights from Fehr and Tyran￿ s (2001) experimental evidence, indicating that
both the size and signs of the shocks should matter in in￿ uencing the degree of
strategic stickiness of expectations. As a consequence, we restricted the possible
transition functions to (5) and (7a) we chose among the two based on model
evaluation criteria. The result we obtained is that the quadratic logistic function
seems to better ￿t our data in three cases out of four, suggesting that it should
be more the size of the past forecast error than the sign determining strategic
stickiness in the adjustment of consumers￿expectations. Once chosen both the
transition variable and the transition function, we are ￿nally able to estimate
our STECM models, as shown in table 8.23.
At a ￿rst glance the STECM models seem to perform very well, and cer-
tainly better than their linear rivals at least in terms of parameters signi￿cance.
The estimation of these models clearly involves losing twice as much degrees of
freedom compared to the ECMs, but parallerly it results in generally higher R2
(ranging between 0:27 and 0:56) and not lower Durbin-Watson statistics, a com-
forting sign. A little bit less comforting is the fact that these models solve the
problem of heteroskedasticity of residuals only in two cases out of four, namely
in Italy and in the US. Probably, this is due to the large number of outliers
that are still present in the sample and that at this stage we did not attempt
to correct. The transition function that the data generally seem to prefer is the
quadratic logistic one, with the only exception of the UK which seems to favor
the simple logistic. That is an indication that size more than sign asymmetry
might be very important in determining the stickiness of expectations, and it is
indeed consistent with one particular feature of money illusion: once the size of
a nominal shock exceeds a certain (subjective) loss threshold, individuals start
to take into considerations the (high) costs of reasoning in nominal terms rather
than in real ones24. Also notice that the smoothness parameter ￿ is generally
estimated quite imprecisely, while the other threshold parameters have always
high signi￿cance. These two regularities in our estimation should both to be
taken as positive. Normally in nonlinear models the standard deviation of the
smoothness parameter tends to grow with the size of the parameter itself, and
a precise estimate is always di¢ cult to obtain25. To have a clearer idea of
23Notice that in our estimation of STECMs we standardize the exponent of the F(:) function
by divinding it to the variance of the chosen transition variable. This is an adviced choice to
render the parameters ￿;c1 and c2 scale free and it does not in￿uence the other parameters￿
estimates. See Terasvirta (1994) for more details.
24Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1985, 2000) name this kind of behavior ￿ near rational￿ , in the
sense that it implies only second order losses. Indeed, money illusion can only be operational
in contexts of slow and small nominal price increases: in situations of hyperin￿ation (e.g. the
Nazi Germany during the 30s) people are perfectly aware of their loss or purchasing power,
hence money illusion is totally absent.
25As noted by Terasvirta (1994), when ￿ is large and at the same time the c parameters
are su¢ ciently close to zero, a negative de￿nite Hessian matrix is di¢ cult to obtain for mere
numerical reasons, even when convergence is achieved. That is the reason why joint estimation
of the threshold parameters and the other model parameters is generally not adviced.
1920how the adjustment of expectations is behaved and to understand how strategic
stickiness a⁄ects it, let us examine more closely ￿gure 3.
For each country, on the left side we ￿nd two panels regarding model perfor-
mance, both in terms of actual versus ￿tted values and of residuals￿behavior.
On the right side instead, we can see how the estimated transition function
evolves in time and how it is in￿ uenced by the transition variable itself.
For all the four countries it seems that there is still a lot to be done from
the model speci￿cation point of view. Although the actual and the ￿tted se-
ries correlate very much, the models still fail to capture some of the largest
movements in the forecast error, especially at the end of the sample with the
recent ￿nancial crisis. The properties of the estimated transition functions in
the upper and lower right panels deserve some particular attention.
The quadratic logistic function for both Italy and the US show a very sim-
ilar pattern, oscillating between zero and one as the observed forecast error
exceeds or stays in the threshold range (c1;c2). However, for the Italian case,
nonlinearity seems to explain mainly the behavior of data in the ￿rst part of
the sample, while the opposite is true for the US. Parallerly, the bottom right
panels of both the Italian and the US estimations show that the transmission
function becomes close to zero and linear for low values of the past forecast
errors, respectively between (0;2) and (￿1;1). This supports the hypothesis of
strategic stickiness since there is almost no adjustment of expectations to the
long-run equilibrium when past errors are very small (whatever their sign is):
Money illusion is operational at its highest potential since the costs of those
errors are almost irrelevant. Notice instead that when past forecast errors are
in the threshold range (c1;c2), indicated by the shaded area in the graphs, non-
linearity kicks in and the transition function takes positive values, approaching
one for larger values of past errors. This is a sign that expectations gradually
loose their strategic stickiness due to money illusion, as forecast errors become
larger and larger, yielding high costs. Clearly a linear cointegration analysis
could not have given us so much information about these factors a⁄ecting the
speed of adjustment of expectations.
The case of France is a little bit di⁄erent. Even though the quadratic logistic
function is still the one which better ￿ts the data, the overall performance of
the estimated STECM model seems to beat the one of all the other countries
in terms of ￿t (R2 = 0:56). To con￿rm that, the left panels of ￿gure 5 show
that only the ￿nancial crisis of 2008 is not entirely captured by the model, and
consequently also the residuals look better behaved than the others. However,
from the bottom left panel we can see that the transition function remains
for the majority of the time at its minimum value, with just few observations
exceeding the threshold range. This is consistent with a quite precise estimate
of the smoothness parameter ￿ = ￿2:71 (p-value=0:08), the lowest ￿ we obtain.
We interpret these results in terms of a high persistence of money illusion on
behalf of French consumers: for past forecast errors falling in the range (￿2;2)
the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is almost irrelevant, and indeed
for the great part of the time sample expectations display strategic stickiness.
The case of UK is also peculiar, since it is the logistic function that the data
2122seem to choose. According to Fehr and Tyran￿ s (2001) results, expectations
errors should be very sensitive to sign asymmetry, hence the logistic function is
the one we were expecting the data to choose more often, while this is only the
case for English data26. From the right side panels we can clearly see that the lo-
gistic STECM model fails to capture many movements of the forecast error both
in the ￿rst half of the sample and after 2008. The UK adjustment coe¢ cient
remains at its minimum value until the forecast error exceeds approximately the
value of 3, indicating high strategic stickiness of expectations for shocks smaller
than that threshold. After that, cointegration becomes almost linear, and also
English consumer adjust their errors to the long-run equilibrium.
Our general conclusion is that in our data there is evidence of money illusion
resulting in strategically sticky in￿ ation expectations. Furthermore, our data
seem to suggest that it is the size more than the sign of past forecast errors
that matters more in explaining strategic stickiness. Nevertheless, given the
early stage of our analysis, we want to make it clear that the good ￿t of the
STECM speci￿cation for our data does not exclude the relevance of other types
of theoretical models we did not consider to explain a nonlinear adjustment of
expectations.
5 Concluding Remarks
A model of ￿ ecological rationality￿posits that when agents are con￿ned with
complex tasks such as forecasting in￿ ation, they should use the best heuristics
methods they have, given the available information sets. Indeed reasoning in
nominal terms and ignoring low future in￿ ation might be a powerful rule of
thumb in a low and stable in￿ ation environment. This paper has shown that
traces of such heuristic behavior can also be found in the aggregate expected
in￿ ation time series.
By using standard rationality tests and novel econometric techniques like
STECMs, we obtain two main results. On the one hand, European consumers
seem to systematically overpredict the level of future in￿ ation, being also very
much in￿ uenced by the speed of di⁄usion of the available information (stickiness
￿ la Carrol, 2003). On the other hand, there seems to be a strong evidence also
for strategic stickiness, implied by the fact that small past forecast errors have a
much lower in￿ uence on the speed of adjustment of expectations than large ones.
In such a context, we obtain that size asymmetry seems to play a greater role
than sign asymmetry in determining such stickiness. We interpret this ￿ndings
as a manifestation of the presence of money illusion, since it is the e⁄ect of a
26Nevertheless, we should notice there is one big di⁄erence between Fehr and Tyran￿ s exper-
imental setting and our context. Fehr and Tyran were able to implement a fully anticipated
monetary shock on experimental subjects and study its e⁄ects, while here we can only study
the e⁄ects of past forecast errors on the aggregated adjustment mechanism of expectations.
Indeed, it is possible to think of past forecast errors as incorporating exogenous monetary
shocks, and clearly we based our notion of strategic stikiness on such a proxying. However,
due to these considerations it is not possible to interpet the sign/size asymmetry favored by
our models exactly in the same way as Fehr and Tyran.
23strategic way of thinking in a context where in￿ ation adjustments are strategic
complements.
Of course one can always question the informative content of expectations
series derived from qualitative survey data. Moreover, the use of nonlinear time
series techniques implies particular caution because it is sensitive to the choice
of the starting parameters and of the algorithm used. In particular, STECMs
are admittedly vulnerable to mispeci￿cation errors either in small samples, or
in samples with multiple outliers. VDF (2000) also show that the availability of
high frequency data (i.e. weekly or daily time series) increases the power of the
nonlinearity tests and it could be helpful to distinguish ￿ disguised￿nonlinearity
from true nonlinearity.
Clearly, all the above considerations can provide fruitful insights for future
research in this topic. A particularly promising new line for future research
regards the application of panel smooth transition autoregression techniques,
like the ones used in BØreau, Lopez, Villavicencio and Mignon (2010) to in-
￿ ation expectations data. We are aware that our analysis of each expectation
series separated one from the other implies a certain loss of potential variabil-
ity/heterogeneity in the data, hence we hope to amend for this weakness in
future work. Finally, it would be very interesting to conduct our investigation
of strategic stickiness also with disaggregated expectations data, along the lines
of what Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) do for the Michigan Consumer Survey data.
Nevertheless, this kind of analysis is subject to a data availability constraint
for European countries, since the European Commission does not publish the
disaggregated data for the survey of consumers￿expectations. At any rate, and
bearing in mind all these potential improvements of our work, we want to stress
our main ￿nding: consumers￿in￿ ation expectations do exhibit a relevant degree
of strategic stickiness which can be reconducted to behavioral biases like money
illusion.
24Appendix
A. The European Commission Consumers Survey and the
Carlson-Parking￿ s (1975) Method
In the European Commission consumers survey, consumers are asked the follow-
ing question on future price developments (Question 6): ￿By comparison with
the past 12 months, how do you expect consumer prices will develop in the next
12 months? They will ...
1. increase more rapidly
2. increase at the same rate
3. increase at a slower rate
4. stay about the same
5. fall
6. don￿ t know
The ￿ Probability approach￿(Carlson-Parking,1975) is based on the idea to
interpret the share of responses to each category as estimates of areas under the
density function of aggregate in￿ ation expectations, that is to say as probabili-
ties. By specifying a distribution function for these probabilities (generally the
logistic or the normal distributions are employed) it is then possible to compute
a measure of the mean expected in￿ ation and its standard deviation, together
with the two response thresholds ￿t and "t. In particular Denoting Si (for
i = 1;2;3;4;5) as the sample proportions opting for each of the ￿ve response
categories in the survey undertaken in month t, equations (8) to (11) below give


























































t indicates expected in￿ ation and ￿e
t denotes the standard deviation of
the aggregate distribution for in￿ ation expectations, and ￿
p
t￿12 is the perceived
rate of in￿ ation at time t ￿ 12 used as a scaling factor following Berk (1999).
Finally, N￿1[:] is the inverse of the assumed probability distribution function
25which has the following arguments: Z1
t￿12 = N￿1[1 ￿ S1
t￿12]; Z2










The above expressions for the mean and standard error of expected future
in￿ ation express the mean and the uncertainty of expected in￿ ation as a function
of the actual and the perceived rate of in￿ ation, which is used as a scaling
function. It has been shown by Berk (1999) that using a notion of perceived
in￿ ation as a scaling function for the above system signi￿cantly improves the
accuracy of the derived expectations series. The perceived rate of in￿ ation can
be computed by slightly modifying the Carlson Parkin method and applying it
to Question 5 of the EC Consumer Survey, related past price developments.
For a more detailed description of this approach and of the rescaling based
on perceived in￿ ation, we suggest to refer to Berk (1999) and Gerberding (2007).
For a critical survey of alternative methods to transform qualitative data into
quantitative ones see Nardo (2003).
B. Replicating VDF (2000)27
The case for nonlinear adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is partic-
ularly evident for equivalent assets in the context of e¢ cient ￿nancial markets
(Yadav et al 1994, and Anderson 1995). Indeed, prices of equivalent assets
should be such that investors are almost indi⁄erent between holding for exam-
ple stocks or futures with similar characteristics, or bonds of di⁄erent maturity
from the same issuing company. Nevertheless, market frictions (transaction
costs, short selling restrictions etc.) which are di⁄erent for each trader, give rise
to asymmetric adjustment of prices deviations from the no arbitrage equilib-
rium. Coherently with such a framework, VDF (2000) illustrate the properties
of STECM models by taking as an example a monthly bivariate interest rate se-
ries for the Netherlands composed by one- and twelve-month interbank interest
rates (indicated respectively as R1t and R12t) from January 1981 to December
1985. In this section we are able to replicate their results by using the same
STECM estimation strategy we applied in our paper.
From simple graphical inspection of Figure 9, one can already see that the
two time series display a tendency to move together. Indeed, unit roots tests
on the individual series con￿rm that the two interest rates are individually I(1)
(ADF t-statistics are respectively ￿1:26 and ￿1:25), while the spread between
the two, St = R12;t￿R1;t, can be considered stationary (ADF t-statistic ￿2:90).
The ￿rst step of VDF￿ s procedure to specify a STECM model for St consists
in ￿tting a standard linear ECM model. Having had evidence for cointegration
through the Johansen trace test, a V ECM(1) for the ￿rst di⁄erences of the two
27The programs we used in this paragraph and all the other ones we used for model esti-
mation are available upon request.
26interest rates is ￿tted with the following result28:
D(R12)t = 0:11
(0:068)
￿ (R12t￿1 ￿ 1:029
(0:018)








￿ (R12t￿1 ￿ 1:029
(0:018)






The authors then choose to restrict the cointegrating vector to (1;￿1); being
the standard error of R1t￿1 equal to 0:018. Moreover, since the error correction
coe¢ cient not signi￿cant in the equation for the twelve-months interest rate,
they estimate a conditional ECM model for R1t by conditioning it on R12t. The
resulting ECM speci￿cation is then taken as a basis for the subsequent analysis
for nonlinearities in the adjustment process (Here for notational simplicity we






￿ St￿1 + 0:92
(0:04)
￿ Yt ￿ 0:16
(0:07)
￿ Xt￿1 + 0:09
(0:08)
￿ Yt￿1 (12)
Equation (12) has a problem of residuals non-normality (JB statistic=135:51
and Kurtosis=7:27), which might be caused both by aberrant observations at
the beginning of the sample and by neglected nonlinearity. As a consequence
of that, the second step of VDF￿ s procedure is testing for possible nonlinearity
in the error correction mechanism by means of the Lukkonen et al.￿ (1988) test,
28Standard errors are given in parentheses.
29As a check of correctness of our procedure, notice that the estimated parameters in equa-
tion (12) closely replicate the ones of equation (13) in VDF￿ s (1997) paper.
27generalized by Terasvirta (1994), Swanson (1996) and VDF(2000) in the context
of smooth transition autoregressive models.
As we already explained, the test is based on a reparametrization of the
STECM model by approximating the F(:) function with its third order Taylor
approximation, and on computing a LM test for the null hypothesis H0
0 : ’1 =
’2 = ’3 = 0. Through a similar procedure it is also possible to obtain an
estimate of the appropriate lag d￿ for the transition variable St￿d,and of the
most convenient form of the transition function.
Table 13 shows that for the choice of the transition variable, lag d￿ = 1
yields the lowest p-value. Therefore we agree with the choice of VDF to select
St￿1 as transition variable.
The choice of the transition function should be conducted by means of a
similar procedure where a sequence of alternative tests is carried out sequen-
tially. However, since there is no guarantee that this sequence will give rise to
the right answer, we will use a more practical strategy, as VDF: we estimate
the STECM with the three types of transition function and chose the one that
best ￿ts the data. After alternative speci￿cations are estimated, and based on
di⁄erent information criteria, we reach the same conclusion of VDF choosing
the quadratic logistic transition function.
As suggested by Terasvirta (1994), we estimate the ￿nal STECM model by
nonlinear least squares in two steps. First, we use the estimated parameters
in equation (12) as starting values to estimate the ￿0
2 vector of parameters,
imposing sensible starting values for the ￿, c1 and c2 parameters30. Then, we
estimate the ￿nal STECM model by giving as initial values b ￿
0
1 and b ￿
0
2 obtained
in the previous step. Our procedure yields parameters estimates and standard





￿ St￿1 + 0:90
(0:04)
￿ Yt ￿ 0:24
(0:09)
￿ Xt￿1 + 0:23
(0:1)





￿ St￿1 + 0:15
(0:19)
￿ Yt ￿ 0:17
(0:17)






St￿1 ￿ (St￿1 ￿ 1:25
(0:12)
) ￿ (St￿1 + 0:40
(0:08)
))￿1]
The large standard error of the estimated ￿ is a very common problem
30Terasvirta (1994) suggests to inizialize the F(:) parameters with ￿ = 1 and c1 = c2 =
mean(transition variable).
28in the estimation of smooth transition functions, which makes it generally very
di¢ cult the joint estimation of the F(:) parameters. Furthermore, the estimates
of ￿, c1 and c2 and their standard errors are sensitive to rescaling, and to the
type of algorithm used. Fortunately, these uncertainties do not a⁄ect the other
parameters estimates.31
31Nonlinear estimation is always cumbersome because one risks that algorithm used ￿nds
only one of the local maxima, and possibly not the best one. In order to be sure that what
we found with our iterative procedure was at least ￿ the best￿local maximum of the likelihood
function, we run a tridimensional grid search for the threshold parameters of the F(:) function,
￿, c1 and c2. This further check con￿rms the robustness of VDF￿ s ￿ndings and the correctness
of our procedure, since it indicates that the maximum found is actually the ￿ best￿among the
other local maxima. The Eviews programs we wrote to perform this robustness check is also
given at the end of this technical appendix.
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